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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Were the eight t he f t s charged in the information 
par t of a s ingle criminal episode so tha t three of them were 
properly joined for t r i a l under Rule 9? 
2. Did the prosecutor commit revers ib le er ror in 
( 
re fer r ing to defendant 's pr ior conviction during closing 
argument, when that conviction was proved at trial and the 
prosecutor merely asked the jury to consider the conviction in 
weighing defendant 's c r e d i b i l i t y ? 
3 . Was the jury ins t ruc ted on a mandatory rebut table 
presumption in v io l a t ion of S ta te v. Chambers,, 20 Utah Adv. Rpt. 
14 (Oct. 21f 1985), and Francis v, Franklin, U.S. , 105 
S.Ct. 1965 (1985)? 
4. Was there evidence supporting the jury instruction 
that the jury may presume knowledge or belief that the items were 
stolen because defendant had received other stolen property 
within the preceeding year? 
5. Did the trial court properly admit pawn cards 
representing other pawn transactions to show that defendant knew 
or believed the property at issue probably was stolen? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
- v -
ROBERTO TARAFA, 
Defendant -Appel lant . 
Case No. 20561 
AMENDED BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with eight counts of theft by 
receiving, seven third-degree felonies, and a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1978). 
Five counts were dismissed without prejudice prior to preliminary 
hearing and three third-degree felonies were bound over for 
trial. 
Defendant was convicted of two counts of theft by 
receiving and acquitted of a third count, in a jury trial held 
February 19-21, 1985, in the Third Judicial District Court, in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, presiding. Judge Frederick sentenced defendant on 
February 21, 1985, to two indeterminate terms not to exceed five 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
Defendant was charged with eight counts of theft by 
receiving occurring on various dates between October 20, 1984 and 
November 14, 1984 (R. 11-15). At preliminary hearing, five of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 
t h e counts were d ismissed wi thout p r e j u d i c e and defendant was 
bound over for t r i a l on t h r e e counts o c c u r r i n g on October 27, 
November 3 and November 14 (R. 6 - 1 0 ) . P r io r t o t r i a l , defendant
 ( 
moved t o sever the t h r e e remaining counts and the S t a t e moved t o 
j o i n t h e f i v e counts p r e v i o u s l y d ismissed wi th t h e t h r e e t h a t 
remained (R. 21-22 , 2 6 ) . Both motions were denied (R. 3 6 ) .
 { 
On October 27 , 1984 f defendant so ld a too lbox f u l l of 
t o o l s and a f l u t e t o the Midtown Pawnshop in S a l t Lake City for 
$55 (R. 199-200, 2 0 3 ) . E a r l i e r t h a t day, sometime between 9:00
 { 
p.m. on t h e 26th and 1:00 a.m. on t h e 27 t h , a f l u t e and t h e 
t oo lbox were s t o l e n from an Orem home (T. 171-17 3 ) . The owner 
va lued the too lbox a t $300-$400 and an e x p e r t valued the f l u t e a t 
$275-320 (T. 1 9 3 ) . 
Defendant lived in Provo at this time (R. 365). Nelson 
Florez, a friend of defendant's, came by defendant's apartment in 
Provo and asked defendant to lend Florez his car and to drive 
with Florez to Salt Lake City, to pawn something (T. 366). 
Florez told defendant that he could get more money for items 
pawned in Salt Lake City and that he needed defendant to help him 
because he did not have any identification (T. 366). This 
occurred several times, at least seven or eight (T. 366). Each 
time, defendant gave an outdated Salt Lake City address as his 
current address except on one occasion when he used an outdated 
Provo address from his driver license (T. 400, 402-404). 
On November 3, 1984, defendant sold a guitar and a ring 
at the Mission Pawnshop in Salt Lake City at Florez's request 
(T. 231-235). The guitar, a steel string Ventura, with a hard 
-2-
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c a r r y i n g case f was s t o l e n from a Provo home in t h e evening hours 
of November 2 t o e a r l y morning on November 3 , 1984 (T. 218 , 224) . 
There was c o n f l i c t i n g tes t imony on t h e f a i r market value of the 
g u i t a r and c a s e . The owner valued them a t about $330 (T. 225) . 
D e f e n d a n t s e x p e r t w i t n e s s va lued them a t about $175-185 
(T. 349) , whi le t h e S t a t e ' s r e b u t t a l e x p e r t valued them a t a 
minimum of $300 (T. 3 5 4 ) . The j u r y found defendant not g u i l t y of 
t h i r d - d e g r e e fe lony t h e f t for t h i s pawn t r a n s a c t i o n (R. 81) . 
On November 14 , 1984, defendant so ld a v ideo c a s s e t t e 
r eco rde r made up of two components a t P a h l ' s Annex Pawnshop i n 
S a l t Lake Ci ty for $150 (T. 254, 257-258) . Florez accompanied 
defendant and approached the shop owner about the s e l l i n g p r i c e 
for t h e VCR but t h e shop owner gave t h e $150 to defendant 
(T. 261-262, 263) . The VCR and a w a l l e t were s t o l e n from Paul 
V e l a s c o ' s Provo home in t h e e a r l y morning hours of November 14 , 
1984 (T. 245, 247) . Velasco va lued the VCR a t $800 (T. 250) . 
When p o l i c e o f f i c e r s a r r e s t e d defendant , defendant s a i d 
t h a t Florez t o l d defendant t h a t Florez took the VCR but Florez 
would not say from where (T. 272 f 3 7 1 ) . Defendant s a i d they 
rece ived $150 for t h e VCR and spent $30 (T. 273) . Defendant had 
$120 when he was booked i n t o j a i l on November 14 f 1984, the same 
day t h a t he sold the VCR (T. 282-283) . 
Defendant admit ted t h a t he pawned t h e i tems t h a t were 
the b a s i s for the t h r e e counts of t h e f t and t h a t he pawned i tems 
for F lorez on seve ra l o ther occas ions (T. 366, 377) . He claimed, 
n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h a t the did not know or b e l i e v e t h a t t he i tems 
were s t o l e n (T. 379) . 
- 3 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
{ 
Defendant i den t i f i ed the pawn cards from several other 
spec i f i c pawn t ransac t ions (T. 390-399). He also admitted to 
using Paul Velasco fs American Express Card to buy shoes and pants 
for himself (T. 382-383). Velasco 's wal le t was s tolen in the 
November 14 incident (T. 244-245) . Defendant said he thought the 
c red i t card was s tolen when he and Florez used i t (T. 382). 
Thumbprints on a l l of the pawn cards matched defendant 's 
thumbprint, without a doubt (T. 287, 292-3 f 297). 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
Joinder was proper in t h i s case because the three 
the f t s by receiving were a l l part of a s ingle criminal episode. 
The pawnshop t ransac t ions were iden t ica l in nature and involved 
s to len a r t i c l e s a l l received from a s ingle source. The three 
counts were closely re la ted in time and pursuant to a s ingle 
criminal ob jec t ive . 
There was no prosecutor ia l misconduct during closing 
argument when the prosecutor referred to defendant 's pr ior 
convict ion. The clear import of the comments was t ha t the 
prosecutor wanted the jury to consider defendant 's criminal 
h i s to ry in weighing h i s c r e d i b i l i t y as a wi tness . This i s a use 
of the evidence tha t the jury may c lear ly make. 
The jury ins t ruc t ions t h a t the jury may presume 
knowledge or bel ief tha t the items probably were s tolen did not 
c rea te a mandatory rebut table presumption. The i n s t r u c t i o n s , 
when read together , could not have been in te rpre ted as sh i f t ing 
the burden of proof to defendant by a reasonable j u ro r . 
- 4 -
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There was evidence that defendant had received other 
stolen property within the year preceding at least some of the 
offenses. Even if this evidence was insufficient to support the 
presumption under § 76-6-408f it was harmless error to instruct 
the jury as to this presumption because there was sufficient 
other evidence of guilty knowledge or belief. 
The pawn cards relating to pawn transactions other than 
those supporting the charges were properly admitted. Defendant 
himself provided the necessary foundation and the cards were 
relevant to show thatf by the sheer number of identical pawn 
transactions, defendant knew or believed the property was stolen. 
Even if the cards should not have been admitted, it was harmless 
because the evidence had already come in through defendant's 
testimony to which defendant did not object nor move to strike. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JOINDER OF THE THREE OFFENSES IN THIS CASE 
WAS PROPER BECAUSE THEY WERE PART OF A 
SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE. 
The question of whether offenses constitute a single 
criminal episode arises in two contexts. The first context is 
Double Jeopardy. There, a defendant may find himself erroneously 
charged with multiple offenses which are not only part of a 
single criminal episode but which are also based upon the "same 
act" as defined in the single criminal episode statute, Utah Code 
-5-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1978).x The second context is Joinder, the 
situation at hand. There a defendant feels either that his 
multiple offenses arising from separate acts should or should not 
have been joined for trial because they are or are not part of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 
(1978) . 
The Utah cases cited by defendant in his brief at 6-9 
are all cases dealing with the double jeopardy or "same act" 
question. See e.g. State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983); 
State v, Ireland. 570 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1977); State V, Cornishr 
571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977) . The issue raised by defendant, 
however, is joinder—whether the offenses charged were part of a 
single criminal episode so that they could properly be tried 
together. At first blush, the cases defendant cites appear to be 
relevant in that they purport to delineate what is a single 
criminal episode. Closer scrutiny, nevertheless, reveals that 
these cases do not support a conclusion that defendant's crimes 
were not part of a single criminal episode. 
In the cases cited above and cited in defendant's 
brief, the defendants argued that the multiple crimes charged 
were part of a single criminal episode and, therefore, claimed 
1
 Section 76-1-402(1) provides: A defendant may be prosecuted in 
a single criminal action for all separate offenses arising out of 
a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a 
defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish 
offenses which may be punished in different ways under different 
provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only 
one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence 
under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other such 
provision. (Emphasis added). 
-6-
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t h a t to avoid double jeopardy they could only be prosecuted for 
one crime. This argument i s flawed in tha t mult iple a c t s , a l l 
par t of a s ingle criminal episode, .can be the basis for mult iple 
charges. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1978); Sta te v. Por ter . 
705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 1985). In two of these cases, the 
Court1s rul ing tha t there was no double jeopardy problem was, 
however, based on the preliminary conclusion t ha t i t was not even 
dealing with a s ingle criminal episode. 
The Cour t ' s conclusions in Ireland2and Cornish3 were 
based on Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 which provides: 
In this part unless the context requires a 
different definition, "single criminal 
episode" means all conduct which is closely 
related in time and is incident to an attempt 
or an accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective. 
This Court concluded that offenses committed as part of 
the escape attempts in these cases were not a part of a single 
2
 In State v. Ireland. 570 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1977), the defendant 
was stopped for speeding, pulled a gun, took the patrolman's gun, 
locked the patrolman in the trunk of the patrol car and left the 
scene. Later, Ireland picked up two hitchhikers, related what he 
had done and told them they did not have to remain with him. 
They rode on with Ireland and when police officers began 
following them, Ireland told the hitchhikers they were his 
hostages and held the gun on them. Ireland was convicted in 
Sevier County of kidnapping and in Beaver County for aggravated 
robbery. Ireland raised a double jeopardy claim that was 
rejected. 
3 
In S ta te v. Cornish. 571 P.2d (Utah 1977), the defendant s to le a 
car . The next day, the stolen car , driven by Cornish, was 
spotted and a high-speed chase ensued. Cornish was convicted of 
car thef t and f a i l u re to stop in separate prosecutions. He 
ra ised a double jeopardy claim tha t was rejected because the 
Court found the ac t s were not part of a single criminal episode. 
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criminal objective shared by the original crime the defendants 
were attempting to avoid. While in Ireland the Court found that 
the two acts were not close in time (separated by the time it 
took to drive 65 miles), the more critical aspect of the decision 
was that the acts were unrelated in objective (the hitchhikers 
were not picked up as hostages originally but only became 
hostages when the necessity to avoid capture arose). 
In Cornish, the Court said that a one day separation 
between the crimes did not meet the "close in time" requirement 
but focused its attention mainly on the single objective aspect. 
There the Court determined that the objective of the escape 
attempt was not the same as the objective of stealing a car. 
The Court wanted to avoid irretrievably entangling crimes 
committed to avoid arrest for prior criminal activity with the 
original offense. 
The question remains whether the terms "closely related 
in time" and "single criminal objective" under § 76-1-401 should 
be limited by Ireland and Cornish. As noted abovef Ireland and 
Cornish mainly focus on whether the acts were the same act for 
double jeopardy purposes. The separation in time of one day or 
the time it takes to drive 65 miles do not appear to be such long 
periods of time that the acts were, per sef not closely related 
in time. It is also difficult to understand why an escape 
attempt to avoid prosecution for criminal activity is not part of 
a single criminal objective—i.e. getting away with the crime. 
Apparently, the Court and the parties confused the meanings of 
single criminal episode and "same act." They evidently reasoned 
-8-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that they could not find that a single criminal episode existed 
without also finding there was only one actf one crime. 
The focus of the case at bar, however, is 
distinguishable from that of Ireland and Cornish, Here, the 
defendant was charged with eight separate acts of theft by 
receiving and he has not raised a double jeopardy claim. Each 
act was fairly close in time and was accomplished under nearly 
identical circumstances and with a single criminal objective. 
Each time defendant was accused of pawning stolen articles, he 
did so at the request of Nelson Florez. They drove together from 
Provo to Salt Lake City, sometimes pawning articles in more than 
one pawnshop in a single day. Each time defendant gave an 
outdated address as his current address. The incidents forming 
the basis for the original eight charges were all within a four 
week period from October 20, 1984 to November 14, 1984 (R. 11-
13). While five of these charges were dismissed without 
prejudice at the preliminary hearing, they should all be taken 
into account when determining whether the three remaining charges 
were part of a single criminal episode.4 
State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983), cited by 
defendant, is also distinguishable from the case at hand. 
In Hail, the defendant was charged with multiple counts in two 
separate informations of theft by receiving stolen firearms which 
4
 It is not clear from the record exactly why the five charges 
were dismissed. At preliminary hearing, however, it appears that 
the State was prepared to proceed only on the three counts that 
were bound-over. See R. 9 at 759 (State's motion to continue); 
and see R. 6 at 1044 (State not ready to proceed). 
-9-
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were a l l received by him simultaneously rather than on separate 
occasions. After acqu i t t a l in one case, defendant was t r i e d on 
the second information and found g u i l t y . He appealed on double 
jeopardy grounds. This Court held tha t not only was there a 
s ingle criminal episode but a lso there was only one act of thef t 
by receiving because the firearms were a l l received a t one time. 
This Court held, as defendant points out f t ha t i t was the time of 
rece ip t of the s tolen goods by defendant that determines when 
thef t by receiving occurred and not the time tha t the a r t i c l e s 
were taken from the i r t rue owners. 671 P.2d a t 207. 
While Hai l does support defendant 's contention t h a t the 
ac t s charged here were not par t of a s ingle criminal episode, 
i t appears t h a t the Cour t ' s language in analyzing the s ingle 
criminal episode s t a t u t e s in Bair i s somewhat imprecise. 
The Court apparently ascribed to the phrase "s ingle criminal 
episode" the same meaning ascribed to the phrase "the same a c t . " 
This cannot have been the meaning the Legis la ture intended 
because § 76-1-402(1) c lear ly contemplates tha t several a c t s , 
cons t i t u t ing separa te offenses, could be par t of a s ingle 
criminal episode. See also Sta te v. Por te r , 705 P.2d a t 1178. 
That the Court did equate "single criminal episode" and 
"same act" is evident from the following passage: 
In denying defendant's motion to 
dismiss, the trial court stated, "[Tlhe 
discovery at one time and place of numerous 
articles of property stolen at various times 
and places does not merge the preceding 
offenses into a single criminal episode." 
The court cited and relied upon the following 
rule of law: 
[Rleceiving or concealing different 
articles of stolen property at different 
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times and on separate and unconnected 
occasions even though pursuant to a single 
scheme constitute separate offenses and 
cannot be prosecuted as one crime/ in one 
count, even where all of the property is 
afterwards found in possession of the 
defendant at the same time and place. [66 
Am.Jur.2d Receiving Stolen Property § 14 
(1973). See also State v. Kuhnley, 74 Ariz. 
10, 242 p.2d 843 (1953); Hamilton v. Stater 
129 Fla. 219, 176 So. 89 (1937).] 
Application of the foregoing rule is 
specifically conditioned upon proof that the 
receipt of the different articles of stolen 
property occurred "at different times and on 
separate and unconnected occasions," supra. 
If the evidence does not satisfy this 
condition, but instead shows that the stolen 
articles were all received on one occasion, 
then the converse of the foregoing rule is 
true, i.e., the receipt is considered a 
single offense and must be prosecuted as one 
crime. The relevance of this concept to the 
present issue regarding the single criminal 
episode should be obvious. If defendant's 
receipt of the various stolen guns occurred 
on only one occasion, it definitely satisfied 
the "closely related in time" requirement of 
the single criminal episode statute, as well 
as the "single criminal objective" require-
ment thereof; whereas, if the receipt 
occurred on several occasions, such 
requirements are clearly not satisfied. 
£jailf 671 P.2d at 206 (emphasis added). The last sentence of this 
passage indicates that acts committed on several occasions cannot 
be part of a single criminal episode as defined in § 76-1-401 
because separate offenses are not closely related in time nor part 
of a single criminal objective unless they are the .same act. This 
statement indicates that the Court equated single criminal episode 
with a single offense which is inconsistent with the meaning of 
§ 76-1-402(1). Section 76-1-402(1) read with § 76-1-401 clearly 
indicates that several offenses can be part of a single criminal 
episode if they are closely related in time (not necessarily the 
^ame time) and part of a single criminal objective. 
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The ru le of lawf quoted above, upon which the Court 
r e l i e d in H&iir points out tha t double jeopardy does not bar 
charging mul t ip le counts for separate offenses which are a l l pa r t 
of a "single scheme" (or s ingle criminal episode) . The Court ' s 
language ind ica tes t h a t i t i n te rp re ted t h i s ru le to mean t h a t the 
presence of a s ingle criminal episode always precludes mul t ip le 
charges. A conclusion which i s incons is ten t with both § 7 6 - 1 -
402(1) and Sta te v. Por te r . 705 P.2d a t 1178 (two ac t s of burglary 
in same building on same occasion par t of s ingle criminal episode 
but not same a c t ) . 
The Cour t ' s language was: 
In l i g h t of the afores ta ted f a c t s , [property 
received by defendant on one occasion] we 
conclude tha t the offenses al legedly 
committed by defendant for which he was 
prosecuted in the f i r s t and second (present) 
prosecutions were closely re la ted in time and 
pursuant to a s ingle criminal ob jec t ive . 
Accordingly, we hold t ha t the present 
prosecution i s precluded by the s ingle 
criminal episode s t a t u t e , supra. 
EaiXf 671 P.2d a t 208. What the Court fa i led to include in t h i s 
holding was t h a t not only were the offenses closely re la ted in 
time, they occurred a t the js^me time and were pursuant to a s ingle 
criminal object ive , thus , there was but one crime. Because there 
was only one crime, double jeopardy and § 76-1-402(1) precluded 
mult iple charges and prosecutions for the "same a c t . " Of course, 
indisputedly there was also a s ingle criminal episode but tha t 
fact alone, without also the fact t h a t there was only one ac t , 
would not preclude mult iple charges. 
The relevance of the above discussion i s t h a t E^jj: 
appears to stand in the way of a conclusion tha t there was a 
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single criminal episode in this case because SLaix appears to hold 
that only stolen articles received at the same time constitute a 
single criminal episode. In actualityf JtedJL stands for the 
proposition that stolen articles received at the same time 
constitute not only a single criminal episode but also constitute 
only one act supporting a single charge of theft by receiving. 
This rule does not necessarily preclude finding several separate 
acts of theft by receiving to be part of a single criminal episode 
so long as they are close in time and pursuant to a single 
criminal objective. 
One reason for joining related charges is to avoid the 
inconvenience and the expense for the State and the accused in 
holding separate trials where the same or similar evidence is 
being presented. This reasonf of course, does not override a 
defendant's due process right to a fair trial, however, so long as 
joinder does not prejudice a defendant in his ability to defend 
himself, joinder is appropriate, Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-9 (1982), 
and this Court will not overturn a denial of a motion to sever 
unless there was a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Saunders, 
699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985). Defendant here was not prejudiced by 
joinder and there was no abuse of discretion. 
The evidence admitted on all three charges would have 
been admissible if the crimes were tried separately. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-408(2) (b) creates a presumption that if a defendant 
has received other stolen goods within a year prior to the present 
charge, there is an inference that defendant knew the goods were 
stolen in this case. See also, State v. SIowe, P.2d , 
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slip op. at 3. (Utah Case No. 19990, 20070 filed December 30, 
1985)• Because the evidence would have been admissible in any 
event/ defendant was not prejudiced by joinder of the three 
charges in this case as was the defendant in Saunders. 
POINT IT 
THERE WAS NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
IN THE STATE'S CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
Defendant a l l e g e s t h a t t he p rosecu to r improper ly argued 
in c l o s i n g argument t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s p r i o r bu rg l a ry c o n v i c t i o n 
demonstra ted h i s p r o p e n s i t y t o commit c r imes . See A p p e l l a n t ' s 
Brief a t 14 . While t h e p rosecu to r did r e f e r t o d e f e n d a n t ' s p r i o r 
conv ic t i on dur ing c l o s i n g argument/ i t was not done to deneg ra t e 
h i s c h a r a c t e r . I n s t ead / t he re fe rence was coupled wi th a reques t 
t h a t t h e j u r y cons ider the p r i o r conv i c t i on when weighing 
d e f e n d a n t ' s c r e d i b i l i t y . This i s c l e a r from t h e exchange t h a t 
occur red dur ing the argument/ p a r t of which defendant quo tes i n 
h i s b r i e f . 
The p rosecu to r a rgued: 
I t ' s a c r imina l mind. He ' s a t h i e f with a 
c r imina l mind and a c r imina l mind a t work 
h e r e . He l i e d to the pawn shop employees 
r ega rd ing whether he had a l e g a l r i g h t t o 
pawn the p r o p e r t y . He l i e d t o the pawnshop 
employees r e l a t i v e t o h i s c o r r e c t a d d r e s s , 
and I submit t o you t h a t h e ' s l i e d t o you 
when h e ' s t aken t h e s t a n d . The defendant 
i s the kind of [ s i c ] person f l a d i e s and 
gentlemen/ who would use a f a l s e c r e d i t card 
to o b t a i n p rope r ty for h imse l f . He i s the 
kind of person who would commit a bu rg l a ry / 
who would go i n t o someone's home and s t e a l 
t h e i r purse—as he admi t ted he d id . 
MS. BERGESON: Your Honorf that is an 
improper statement of the law. That evidence 
is admitted only as i t goes to credibility 
and not as i t goes to propensity to commit 
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crime f and I t h ink t h a t ' s an improper 
argument. 
MR. GURULE': I t ' s being o f f e red , your Honor, 
r e l a t i v e t o whether he t o l d t h e t r u t h on the 
s t and . 
THE COURT: Wel l , t h e l a d i e s and gentlemen of 
the j u r y have been t o l d t h a t what counsel say 
to them dur ing c l o s i n g argument or a t any 
o ther t ime i s not ev idence . You've heard t h e 
evidence and y o u ' l l draw your own conc lus ions 
from i t . 
Three minu tes , Mr. G u r u l e ' . 
MR. GURULE': Thank you. 
He i s t h e kind of person who would o b t a i n 
p rope r ty by f r audu len t use of a c r e d i t ca rd , 
and I ask you t o weigh t h a t and weigh t h a t 
heav i ly when you examine the tes t imony t h a t 
he gave you. He 's t h e kind of person who 
would walk i n t o somebody's home and s t e a l 
t h e i r p u r s e . He 's a t h i e f , and I ' d ask you 
t o weigh t h a t c a r e f u l l y when you weigh h i s 
t e s t imony . 
And he i s t h e type of person who would l i e on 
the s tand to save himself from conv ic t ion in 
t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c a se . I submit to you, 
l a d i e s and gentlemen, t h a t i t i s now time for 
the l y i n g t o s t o p . 
(Supp. T. 1 7 - 1 8 ) . Use of a p r i o r conv ic t ion t o show knowledge and 
impeach a d e f e n d a n t ' s c r e d i b i l i t y as i t was used he re i s 
p e r m i s s i b l e under Utah R. Ev. 404 and 609 (Supp. 1985) . 
Even i f the p rosecu to r in tended t o imply something 
o ther than t h e p e r m i s s i b l e use of t h i s ev idence , he was stopped by 
defense counsel and t h e j u ry was reminded through the above 
conversa t ion of the use of the evidence only for impeachment 
pu rposes . Contrary to d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n on appea l , t he 
prosecutor did not then go on to discuss defendant's propensity to 
commit crime, but instead asked the jury to use the evidence when 
weighing defendant's credibility. In any event, defense counsel 
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did not object again to the prosecutor f s reference to the pr ior 
conviction to give the judge another opportunity to correct the 
e r r o r , if in fact i t was e r r o r . Defendant must make a timely 
object ion to p re jud ic ia l argument to preserve the issue for appeal 
and to give the t r i a l court an opportunity to correct the alleged 
e r ro r . S ta te v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 526-527 (Utah 1983); Sta te 
v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1982). Although defendant did move 
for a m i s t r i a l on t h i s bas is after the jury r e t i r e d for 
de l ibe ra t ions , t h i s was not suf f ic ien t to preserve the i s sue . 
HalfiSr 651 P.2d a t 1292. 
In support of h is argument, defendant c i t e s S ta t e v. 
Troy, 688 P.2d 487 (Utah 1984) in which t h i s Court l a i d out a two-
step t e s t for determining whether prosecutor ia l comments required 
r eve r sa l . At the ou t se t , t h i s case i s d i s t inguishable from Troy, 
The prosecutor in Troy made comments t h a t were not permissible for 
any reason; the comments on defendant 's former name and request 
t ha t the jury consider matters not in evidence were not only 
i r r e l evan t but p re jud ic ia l and improper in any event. In t h i s 
case, the p rosecu to r ' s comments were permissible if the jury 
in te rp re ted them as comments on defendant 's c r e d i b i l i t y as a 
wi tness . 
These comments do not even meet step one of the Troy 
t e s t which requires tha t "the remarks ca l l t ed ] to the a t t en t i on of 
the ju ro r s matters which they would not be j u s t i f i e d in 
considering in determining t he i r v e r d i c t . " 688 P.2d a t 486, 
because the jury may consider prior convictions in weighing 
c r e d i b i l i t y . Since s tep one i s not met in t h i s case, t h i s Court 
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need not consider step two; whether they probably influenced the 
jury. 
Because the jury may properly consider pr ior 
convictions in weighing c r e d i b i l i t y f i t was proper for the 
prosecutor to comment on defendant 's pr ior conviction, proved a t 
t r i a l , for the purpose of pointing out to the jury tha t the State 
believed defendant 's testimony was not c red ib le . The prosecutor ' s 
argument c lear ly intended to do only tha t f therefore , i t was not 
prosecutor ia l misconduct to make the comments or to continue with 
them after defendant objected, nor was i t error for the t r i a l 
court to deny defendant 's motion for a m i s t r i a l . 
POINT I I I 
THE JURY WAS NOT INSTRUCTED THAT THE 
§ 76-6-40 8 PRESUMPTION WAS A MANDATORY 
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION. 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in giving 
certain jury instructions. The record indicates that defendant 
objected to these instructions but that objection was on other 
grounds argued in Point V below. Normally failure to make a 
specific objection to a jury instruction at trial precludes 
appellate review. State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568 (Utah 1985). 
But in State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983), this Court 
reviewed a jury instruction in the absence of an objection to 
avoid injustice. Should this Court choose to review the 
challenged instruction, there was no error. 
The jury was given the following instructions: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
The knowledge or belief which the State must 
prove is presumed in the case of an actor who: 
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(a) Is found in possession or control of 
other property stolen on a separate occasion; or 
(b) Has received other stolen property within 
the year preceding the receiving offense charged. 
(R. 65). 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
The court has instructed you that you may 
presume Mr. Tarafa knew the property was 
stolen because he had received other stolen 
property within a year preceding these 
charges. This presumption is permissive in 
nature. That is, you may or may not employ 
it. The inference is also rebuttable. 
Mr. Tarafa1s testimony that he had no 
knowledge the property was stolen is offered 
to rebut the inference. It is for you to 
determine whether this evidence is sufficient 
to overcome the presumption of knowledge. 
The fact that an inference may arise and is 
or is not rebutted by evidence of the defendant 
in no way changes the burden of the state. 
The burden remains with the state to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Tarafa 
knew or believed the property was stolen. 
(R. 66). (Emphasis added). 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23. 
If in these instructions any rule, direction 
or idea has been stated in varying ways, no 
emphasis thereon is intended, and none must > 
be inferred by you. For that reason, you are 
not to single out any certain sentence, or 
any individual point or instruction, and 
ignore the others, but you are to consider 
all the instructions as a whole, and to regard 
each in the light of all the others. 
The order in which the instructions are given 
has no significance as to their relative 
importance. 
(R. 71) (Emphasis added). 
Defendant contends that Instruction No. 22 creates 
a mandatory r e b u t t a b l e presumption l i k e t h a t d isapproved i n £tajte 
v . Chambers, 20 Utah Adv. Rpt. 14 (Oct. 2 1 , 1985) . No doubt , 
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Instruction No. 22 standing alone would improperly shift the 
burden of proof to the defendant. Sandstrom v. Montana. 442 U.S. 
510 (1979). Read together with Instruction No. 23 and 28, how-
ever, it is evident that the presumption was permissive and did 
not shift the burden of proof. 
In Francis v. Franklin, the Supreme Court stated: 
Analysis must focus initially on the 
specific language challenged, but the inquiry 
does not end there. If a specific portion of 
the jury charge, considered in isolation, 
could reasonably have been understood as 
creating a presumption that relieves the 
State of its burden of persuasion on an 
element of an offense, the potentially 
offending words must be considered in the 
context of the charge as a whole. Other 
instructions might explain the particular 
infirm language to the extent that a 
reasonable juror could not have considered 
the charge to have created an unconstitu-
tional presumption. Cupp v. Naughton, 414 
U.S. 141, 147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 
368 (1973). This analysis "requires careful 
attention to the words actually spoken to the 
jury . . . , for whether a defendant has been 
accorded his constitutional rights depends 
upon the way in which a reasonable juror 
could have interpreted the instruction. 
Sandstromr £ii£ra, 442 U.S., at 514, 99 s.ct., 
at 2545. 
105 S.Ct. 1965, 1972 (1985). A reasonable juror could not have 
concluded that the jury instructions in this case, taken as a 
whole, created a mandatory rebuttable presumption. Instruction 
No. 23 stated specifically that the presumption was permissive and 
that the burden remained on the State. Instruction No. 28 
instructed the jury to read all of the instructions as a whole. 
For these reasons, no juror could have reached the conclusion that 
he must employ the presumption or that defendant was required to 
rebut it. 
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Although defendant does not cite it, this Court decided 
State v. Pacheco. 20 Utah Adv. Rpt. 18 (Oct. 21, 1985)f after 
Chambers. While the Court in Pacheco only quoted the offending 
portion of the jury instruction there was additional language in 
the instruction which the State argued cured the error. While the 
Pacheco instruction employed the phrase "prima facie" the 
instruction in this case did not, and they are not the same 
statutory presumption. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) 
(1978) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (2) (a) and (b) (1978). 
This difference in the basis of the instruction does not appear 
significant. There isf therefore, only one way in which the State 
can square this case with Pacheco and square Pacheco with Francis 
v. Franklin. That is to assume that Pacheco is to be read no more 
expansively than is Chambers. There wasf thereforef no error in 
instructing the jury in this case. 
POINT IV 
THERE WAS EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE COURT 
GIVING INSTRUCTION NOS. 22 AND 23. 
Defendant argues that the jury should not have been 
instructed on the presumption of knowledge found in § 76-6-408, 
and outlined in Instructions 22 and 23 quoted in Point III above, 
because there was no evidence supporting the presumption. There 
was, however, evidence to support the inference. 
Defendant admitted that he participated in using Paul 
Velascofs stolen credit card to purchase shoes and pants for 
himself. Use of this credit card could satisfy part (b) of 
Instruction 22—receipt of other stolen property within the year 
preceding the receiving offense charged. 
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Furthermore, each count of r e c e i v i n g s t o l e n p r o p e r t y 
coul d r a i se an ;:i nf er e n c e t h a t d e f e n d a n t ki \e\ ; t h e o t h e r p r o p e r t y 
was. KI II 1 en . 'I hi s :i s e s p e c i a ] ] } i: .r i u= wl i€ r e defei idai i t sa :i d h =; \ 
Florez " t o o k " the VCR which was t h e b a s i s f o r coi in t I I I . 
Fina±±%, % i j i i s D i a ^ ! ^ > + r \m *-•".• *"~.i; ; L w n l 
n o t r e v e r s e for p r r o n p n n c ^vr\r i i ! t ; _ , -_ , ,. .. . m o i c : ? a 
r e a s o n a b l e l i k * ' - : n o o d t h a t ah-se: * tn* c: : ' - .- A reas- n a u l e 
possd t :i J ::ii ty th r • - • * , ' . . , * . 
n o s , ] 99 90 ark . •" : • ^ • r - ' * - ' -
?! 1 1: .1: i :: u gi: :it t l :ie c 
t h a t t h e p r o p e r : was s t -Jen, r r .e : e v. a. e v i d e n c e from v,r.:.:h 
t h e j u r y cou] c . n i c i u i d i knowledn-- en** ** • • ** s n e e r .• 
i lumber of pawi i t r a n s a c t i o n s i n v o l v e d , second was d e f e n u a ; . : g c 
a d m i s s i o n t h a t hi knew F l o r e z " took" t h e VCM, If t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s 
were e r r oneoi is * \\i i t»f i i , \ !,H* « I,I r • • • • •• ': • 
•
 tm£ T R I A L C 0 U R T PROPERLY ADMITTED PAWN 
CARDS THAT RELATED TO OTHER PAWN 
TRANSACTIONS INTO EVIDENCE. 
On cross-exarr . i na t : or., de fendant i d e n t i f i e d seven pawn 
c a r d s from t r a n s a c t : ^nr '*brr 4 v- v * - - — - r • -, . • —
 v- \ a s i s f o r 
I. !itj I:h i kiv '»-">'«- |
 : . _.-_ ;-., s i g n e d 
the c a r d s and p r o v i d e d the i n f c r r . a t - •:,, / i C d i : ; : ; t h u m b p r i n t s , 
:. ... .,, , . , e c a r ^ s conLaine . J 9 0 - 3 9 9 
h e s e pawn t r a n s a c t i o n s wer^ d..^ -:. i\ :,,.. . -; Ne l son _ . i ez 
I i I t h e same manner as t h o s e for which he was oi I t .r i a ] A l l of t h e 
1 .ransa- ;""t i i in. • :>] a c e w i 1 .1 :i:i i : 1 .1 I = • s a r ve • 1 i iiiri = • f i r an i€ • a s t h e t ,1 m r = •e 
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t he f t charges. They were on October 27, 3 0 and 31 and November 3 , 
5 and 6 (See Ex. P-18-24). 
Defense counsel did not object to defendant 's testimony 
concerning these t r ansac t ions . When the Sta te moved for admission 
of the cards as evidence (Ex. P-18-24) f defense counsel objected 
to admission of the cards because they lacked foundation and 
relevance (T. 426) . The t r i a l court admitted the cards f rul ing 
tha t foundation was es tabl ished by defendant 's own testimony and j 
t ha t they were relevant (T. 426). 
Because defense counsel did not object to defendant 's 
testimony f the evidence which he claims was p re jud ic ia l had 
already come in and could be considered by the ju ry . Moreoverf 
the spec i f ic f ac t s surrounding these pawn t ransac t ions merely 
corroborated defendant 's d i rec t testimony tha t he had pawned items 
for Florez on a t l e a s t 7 or 8 occasions (T. 366) . Thus, even if 
the pawn cards themselves were erroneously admitted, t h e i r 
admission was harmless. 
This Court has held t ha t the t r i a l c o u r t ' s ru l ing on 
admiss ib i l i ty of evidence wil l not be overturned unless the court 
so abused i t s d i sc re t ion as to crea te a l ikel ihood t ha t in jus t i ce 
r e su l t ed . Sta te v. Royball, 17 Utah Adv. Rpt. 16 (Sept. 3 , 1985). 
There was no abuse of d i sc re t ion where the evidence had already 
come in through defendant 's testimony and defendant did not object 
to the testimony nor move to s t r i k e i t . 
Notably, although defendant argues tha t the pawn cards 
were admitted as evidence of pr ior bad ac t s f he also argues t ha t 
there was no evidence tha t any of these items were stolen (See 
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/i|)|u. 11 ant u liin.'l at J i - / l 1 I I none of the • i tems were shown t o 
he s t o l e n then pawning them was not a "bad a c t , " Thus, even if 
i h o 1 n d q p h i d p \ 1 1 inli ' i l pi i * * -
would not have v i o l a t e d ttv * >:-. ^: ;:*-.* . t^ iucnce 
defendant c la ims he did , *-hsta~di r,: d^re*~d-^ * s =; ; a i -
I I if nl 1 11 v I I I in 11 ml 1 1 
could come in tu rebut defendant *r , \ . : i : T , •; i; ri n^i xr 
did not bel ievt Mini the p - r ^ ^ rrobalr 'v --.;- — *] •-
 v l . u i ; . 
"lilt1 ylieci numbti ui pawn t . .^ - , ** . . . . .. ci rrumstancep 
llj! 
was o f fered to show t h a t defendant did i n f a c t know or be l i eve 
t h a t t he i terns were s to] ei :n f1 : »i: 1:1 i:i s reasoi 1 tl 1 3 e1 ni dence was 
i" e 1 e v a 1 11 a n d t h e t r i a 1 c o u r t d i d 1 1 o t e 1:1: i 1 1 a dm i 11 i n g I t • 
CQI J CL U21QE 
B a se d 1 1 pc 1 1 t h • = f c 1: e g o i 1 1 g j til: 1 e S t a I: e 1: e 3 u e s t s 11 1 :i s C 01 11: t 
t o affirm defendant 1 s conv ic t ion and deny h i s r eques t for a 1 lew 
trial* 
UATIIi \i\n\ S^A . - , e b r u a r y r "i - . 
DAVI; i . u LKINSON 
A t t w 1 n e y G e n e r a 1 
; ^ ? 3 ^ ^ A ^ ^ 
^.^SANDRA L. ^SJO^ RJEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Def en dan t. / Appe 11 a n 
Case No. CR 8 5-54 
(Judge Frederick) 
TO THE CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY: 
You are hereby requested to prepare, certify and transmit 
to thn Supremo Court nf" the State of Utah, with reference to the 
Notice of Appeal heretofore tiled by the detcndant/appel1 ant, in 
the above cause, all documents contained in the file in the 
a b o v e - e n t i 11 e d in a 11 e i ,. t o g e t h e r w i 1 1 I a . * * ' * • -*-•> - e 
record of the hearing held oi I the 19th and 2 0th days of February, 
19 8 5 and the Motion to Sever heard on the 15th day of February, 
19 8 5 , b e f o i: e 11 I € ; H o i i : > i a I > ] < = I! D E N NIS F R E D E RICI ;, J i I d : j e , T1 I I r d 
District Court. 
DATED this f* day of March, 1985. 
/ ULIX^^J 
NANCY BERGESON/ 
Attorn P V r-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
